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Abstract 
 
 
It is important for central government to have good information about public preferences 
regarding budget allocations. Consumer sovereignty, government popularity, and efficiency 
are all dependent on clear articulation of community preferences. The paper draws upon 
information gathered as part of a large-scale survey to identify community perceptions about 
the state of the New Zealand environment (Hughey et al., 2002) to identify public 
preferences for allocation of government monies. Methods entailed survey participant 
statements of preferences for spending on specified environmental and conservation items, a 
balanced macro-budget reallocation exercise, and a choice modelling exercise to reveal 
willingness to trade-off expenditures on particular budget items.  
 
The environmental budget allocation exercise provides little guidance on which aspects of 
environmental spending would provide the greatest benefits at the margin. For most items the 
modal response was no change in current spending. However, more than 50% of respondents 
indicated they preferred increased spending on pest & weed control, air quality and fresh 
waters. 
 
The macro-budget reallocation and choice modelling exercises provide similar results. They 
both indicated that people obtain negative utility from allocating money to income support, 
and desire cuts to spending on superannuation and income support. Older respondents are not 
as averse to spending on income support, but are still generally in favour of cuts in spending 
on this item. Spending on health, education, and the environment all yield positive benefits. 
Respondents see significantly more benefits from spending on health, than on education or 
the environment. Willingness to spend on health is not affected by respondent age, but 
willingness to spend on education and the environment both decline with age. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Central government budget appropriations provide an area of ongoing debate as ministers 
seek to obtain funds to support their portfolios. Public preferences are important. Allocation 
of money to unpopular activities or failure to allocate funds to perceived good causes not 
only transgresses the concept of consumer sovereignty, but also has implications for 
government popularity, and can result in inefficient allocation of resources. Consequently, it 
is important to have good information about public preferences for central government 
budget allocations. 
This paper reports on research that was designed to identify inter alia public preferences for 
allocation of government monies. The information was gathered as part of a large-scale 
survey to identify community perceptions about the state of the New Zealand environment 
(Hughey et al., 2002).  
Kemp and associates have previously investigated community values associated with New 
Zealand government expenditures, primarily using category rating (Kemp, 1998; Kemp and 
Burt, 2001; Kemp and Willetts, 1995a, 1995b). Kemp’s research has shown relatively low 
correlation between budget allocations and perceived benefits, indicating that transfers of 
government expenditure from high cost, low benefit categories to low cost, high benefit 
categories is likely to improve social welfare. While government budget reallocation could be 
beneficial, it is also important to consider whether benefits exceed costs from government 
spending. Kemp’s research has carefully differentiated between cost and value and has 
concentrated on measurement of benefits received from government services without 
comparison to costs of provision. 
The approaches in this paper indicate the benefits of government budget reallocation and also 
address the efficiency of taxing citizens more (or less) to accommodate changed provision of 
government services. 
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2. Method 
 
Data collection methods are reported in detail in Hughey et al. (2002). In March 2002 a self-
completed survey was mailed to 2000 randomly selected people registered on the New 
Zealand electoral roll. After accounting for known non-delivered surveys, a 45% response 
rate (n=836) was obtained. Females and the elderly were over-represented in responses to the 
survey.  
 
Citizen preferences for reallocation of government spending were measured in three ways.  
 
• At the micro-level, respondents were invited to reallocate government 
spending on items in the Conservation & the Environment portfolio. 
Respondents were requested to maintain a balanced budget within the 
portfolio, a point of difference from previous similar studies (Ferris, 1983; 
Lewis and Jackson, 1985) which have not constrained responses in this 
manner. 
 
• At the macro level respondents were asked to reallocate government spending 
between the competing areas of Defence, Health, Education, Crime 
Prevention, Superannuation & Income Support, and Conservation & the 
Environment. De Groot and Pommer (1987, 1989) have applied similar budget 
allocation games. 
 
• A second macro-level budget allocation exercise applied a stated choice 
method to allow econometric modelling of budget allocation preferences. The 
four items addressed were Health, Education, Income Support, and 
Conservation & Environmental Management. The total budget for these four 
items could vary, which would directly influence taxes, as could the allocation 
of the budget between items. To our knowledge, this approach is novel. 
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3. Environmental Budget Allocation 
 
In the micro-level analysis respondents were asked to indicate how spending on particular 
items in the conservation and environment portfolio should change, given that total 
expenditure on the portfolio could not change. The 5-point response scale was anchored with 
“We should spend far more” and “We should spend far less”. 
 
3.1  Results 
 
Results (Table 1) indicate a reasonably uniform set of responses, with means and standard 
deviations being similar across all environmental items.  
 
Table 1 
Preferred Environmental Budget Allocation 
 
Response frequencies (%)  N 
Spend 
far 
more 
(1) 
Spend 
more 
 
(2) 
No 
change
 
(3) 
Spend 
less 
 
(4) 
Spend 
far 
less 
(5) 
Don’t 
know 
Mean 
(1-5) 
SD 
(1-5) 
Pest & weed control 781 13.4 41.7 34.8 2.2 0.9 6.9 2.31 .78 
Endangered Species 783 12.9 36.5 39.0 4.5 1.4 5.7 2.42 .84 
Air quality 775 13.5 40.5 35.7 3.5 1.2 5.5 2.25 .81 
Native forests & 
bush 
776 6.8 28.1 54.0 5.0 0.8 5.3 2.63 .73 
Soils 760 5.3 27.9 46.3 8.6 0.8 11.2 2.68 .76 
Beaches & coastal 
waters 
780 11.5 36.4 40.9 4.1 0.5 6.5 2.42 .78 
Marine fisheries 782 7.2 26.7 44.9 7.7 1.0 12.5 2.64 .80 
Marine reserves 783 7.2 28.7 44.1 6.3 1.4 12.4 2.61 .80 
Fresh waters 770 12.3 42.3 36.0 1.9 0.3 7.1 2.30 .73 
National parks 778 5.9 25.3 53.5 7.8 1.5 5.9 2.72 .77 
Wetlands 783 6.0 26.4 42.1 9.3 1.9 14.2 2.71 .84 
 
Respondents were not good at balancing the budget in this exercise. Mean scores indicate a 
desire to spend more than at present on all environmental items. Apart from wetlands, no 
more than 10% of respondents wanted less money spent on any particular item. The modal 
response was “no change”, except for pest & weed control, air quality, and fresh waters, 
where the modal response was “spend more”. These three categories are the only ones for 
which more than 50% of respondents preferred additional spending to the status quo1.  
                                                 
1 In each case the majority is highly significant. 99% confidence intervals for the proportions of 
respondents wishing to increase spending on these items are: 
 Pest and weed control 0.55 to 0.64 
 Air quality  0.53 to 0.62 
 Fresh waters  0.54 to 0.64 
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4. Macro-Budget Allocation 
 
In the macro-level budget allocation component survey participants were informed of current 
government spending on six items and asked to identify their preferred allocation over those 
items, given that total expenditure could not change from the initial total of $30 billion per 
year. The items were: Defence, Education, Crime Prevention, Health, Superannuation and 
Income Support, and Conservation and the Environment. 
 
4.1  Results 
 
564 respondents (67.5%) answered this question and fulfilled the requirement to maintain a 
balanced budget. Table 2 provides a summary of responses. Figure 1 compares current and 
mean preferred budget allocations. 
 
Table 2 
Preferred Changes in Macro-Budget Allocation 
 
Preferred CHANGE in spending  
Item 
 
2001 spending Minimum 
($b) 
Maximum 
($b) 
Mean 
($b) 
Standard 
Error 
Defence $1 billion -1.0 14.0 0.1271 0.048 
Education $7 billion -7.0 6.0 0.4537 0.062 
Crime Prevention $1.5 billion -1.5 13.5 0.3617 0.050 
Health $7 billion -7.0 13.0 0.8651 0.074 
Superannuation & Income 
Support 
$13 billion -13.0 2.0 -2.8275 1.311 
Conservation & the 
Environment 
$0.5 billion -0.5 29.5 1.0199 0.095 
Total $30 billion   0.0000  
 
Preferred levels of spending are all significantly different from their current levels (Figure 2). 
Respondents wanted a substantial decrease in spending on superannuation and income 
support (95% confidence interval: $2.6~3.1 billion decrease). An increase in spending was 
desired in all other categories, with the largest desired increase in spending being on 
conservation and the environment (95% confidence interval: $0.8~1.2 billion increase). 
Respondents also preferred a substantial increase in health spending. 
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Figure 1 
Current and Mean Preferred Budget Allocation ($ billion) 
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Figure 2 
Preferred Changes in Budget Allocations ($ billion) 
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5. Choice Experiment 
 
Choice modelling can be thought of as mimicking a political process. Participants are given 
several options (alternatives) from which they must pick a single best alternative. The chosen 
option is assumed to have higher expected utility for the respondent than any other option 
presented to them. If sufficient information is available on people’s choices, then it is 
possible to use statistical methods to derive estimates of coefficients in a utility function that 
describes how people made those choices (Bennett and Blamey, 2001; Louviere et al., 2000). 
 
The choice problem can be concisely formulated using random utility theory. For any 
individual (i), utility associated with alternative k is a function of the characteristics of 
alternative k (Xk) and characteristics of the individual (Zi). 
 
Uik = U (Xk, Zi) 
 
Utility derived from each alternative has 2 components, observable and random. Letting the 
observable portion of utility be V (.), then: 
 
Uik = V (Xk, Zi) + ε (Xk, Zi) 
 
Individual i will choose alternative k over all others if it is expected to yield the most utility. 
Probability of choosing alternative k is: 
 
P (k) = Prob {Vk + ε k  > Vj + ε j, ∀ j≠k} 
 
The probability of choosing any option can only be modelled after assumptions have been 
made about distributions of the error terms. The most common assumption is that the errors 
are Gumbel distributed, leading to the multinomial logit model.  
 
∑=
j
j
k
μV
μV
e
e(k)P  
The scale parameter (μ) is typically assumed to equal unity, implying constant variance. 
Model parameters are estimated by substituting for V with a parametric utility function that is 
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dependent on the vector of attribute levels (X). For example, a linear utility function takes the 
form:  
 
Vk = V(Zk) = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + … + βn Xn = βX’ 
 
Data analysis entails selection of the coefficient vector β that maximises the probability of 
obtaining the observed choices. This is undertaken using maximum likelihood procedures. 
Interaction terms and variable transformations mean that the procedure is not constrained to 
simple linear utility functions. Alternative assumptions about error terms generate different 
models, although the underlying rationale remains unaltered. Once the utility function has 
been estimated it is a straightforward matter to estimate the rate at which people are willing 
to trade off attributes.   
 
5.1  Choice Question Method 
 
The stated preference question provided survey participants with three options for allocation 
of government expenditure between Health, Education, Income Support, and Conservation & 
Environmental Management. Information was provided on public spending on these items in 
2001. The levels of spending on each item defined the options. For any item, spending could 
be unchanged, could increase by $50 million per year, or could decrease by $50 million per 
year. There was no requirement to balance the budget, so it was possible to have options that 
entailed total budget changes across the range +$200 million to -$200 million. Each 
respondent faced only one question. However, nine different versions of the questionnaire 
allowed for combinations of options that allowed estimation of underlying utility functions. 
Survey participants faced three options and were able to select the single option that they 
preferred, signaling the combination of budget items that yielded the highest utility. The 
status quo was not an option. Figure 3 illustrates a representative choice question. 
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Figure 3 
Choice Question 
 
 
Allocation of alternatives to treatments was addressed in the following way: Nine trials were 
identified (following Hahn and Shapiro, 1966) for the case of 4 variables taking 3 levels 
each. These trials were then used as starting points in a shifted-triple design to obtain sets of 
three alternatives. The final design is identified in Table 3. 
 
Diminishing marginal utilities imply that utility functions are not linear. Indeed, internal 
solutions to the budget allocation exercise require a non-linear utility function. Over small 
changes in the levels of budget items it is possible to approximate the utility function using a 
linear form. The range over which the proposed budget changes deviate from the current 
budget allocations is small, indicating the appropriateness of linear approximations to the 
utility function. 
 
The New Zealand government spends about $36 billion each year on a range of public services. 
 
Suppose the government were thinking about changing the amount it spent on health, education, income 
support and conservation and environmental management. Any increase in total spending on these items 
would result in a tax increase, but reduced spending could lower taxes. You are asked for your opinion on the 
following options. You might think there are better options than these ones, but they are the only options you 
can choose from for now. Which option do you prefer? 
 
Change in spending each year ($ million) Area of public spending Approximate 
amount spent in 
2001 
 ($ million) 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Health $7,000 m. $50 m. less no change $50 m. more 
Education $6,733 m. $50 m. less $50 m. more no change 
Income support $13,000 m. $50 m. less $50 m. more no change 
Conservation and 
environmental management 
$500 m. $50 m. less no change $50 m. more 
Change in total taxes collected $200 m less $100 m more $100 m more 
 
π I like option 1 best 
π I like option 2 best 
π
  9
 Maximum change in health budget (X1) 0.7% 
 Maximum change in education budget (X2) 0.7% 
 Maximum change in income support budget (X3) 0.4% 
 Maximum change in conservation and environmental management budget (X4)  10% 
 
Further evidence in support of the linear utility function assumption is provided by Kemp and 
Willetts (1995a), who found that there was no significant difference in ratings when 
respondents were asked about either a 5% increase or a 5% decrease in provision of 
government services. 
 
Table 3 
Choice Experiment Design 
 
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Choice 
set X1 X2 X3 X4 X1 X2 X3 X4 X1 X2 X3 X4 
1 -50 -50 -50 -50 50 50 50 50 0 0 0 0 
2 -50 0 0 50 50 -50 -50 0 0 50 50 -50 
3 -50 50 50 0 50 0 0 -50 0 -50 -50 50 
4 0 -50 0 0 -50 50 -50 -50 50 0 50 50 
5 0 0 50 -50 -50 -50 0 50 50 50 -50 0 
6 0 50 -50 50 -50 0 50 0 50 -50 0 -50 
7 50 -50 50 50 0 50 0 0 -50 0 -50 -50 
8 50 0 -50 0 0 -50 50 -50 -50 50 0 50 
9 50 50 0 -50 0 0 -50 50 -50 -50 50 0 
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5.2  Economic Modelling 
 
There are three policy options when expenditure on any item is considered: 
 
1) Hold taxes constant and pay for increased spending on item i by reducing 
spending on item j (or on several items) by an equivalent amount; i.e. dXi = -
dXj and Xi = -Xj.  
2) Raise taxes to pay for additional spending on item i, leaving other spending 
unaffected.  
3) Additional spending on item i is accompanied by adjustments in spending on 
item j (or on several items) as well as tax changes when dXi ≠ -dXj. This is the 
most general case, allowing taxes and spending on all items to be varied. 
 
The underlying linear utility function is: 
 
V = β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3+ β4X4 + β5TAX   (5.1) 
 
Where the Xis and TAX refer to changes in levels of the corresponding parameters, and 
 
TAX = X1+X2+X3+X4 
 
dV = β1dX1 + β2dX2 + β3dX3+ β4dX4 + β5dTAX 
 
i
i
i βX
V)MU(X =∂
∂=   †  (5.2) 
 
Recognising that tax is a function of the other parameters and substituting to remove tax from 
the utility function (5.3) illustrates why it is not possible to identify (5.1). The linear 
dependence between TAX and the sum of the Xis means that vector β cannot be identified. 
However, it is possible to identify (5.4). 
 
                                                 
† Note that the Marginal Rate of Substitution of good i for good j (MRSij) = MU(Xj)/ MU(Xi) 
indicates how many units of j the consumer will give up in order to obtain an additional unit of i. For 
normal goods, MRSij > 0. 
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V = β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3+ β4X4 + β5(X1+X2+X3+X4) 
 
V  = (β1+β5)X1 + (β2+β5)X2 + (β3+β5)X3 + (β4+β5)X4 (5.3) 
 
V = α1X1 + α2X2 + α3X3 + α4X4  (5.4) 
 
Where αi  = βi+β5 
 
Each αi is the net marginal utility of spending on item i, which includes the benefits obtained 
from spending on the item, as well as the disutility associated with having to pay higher taxes 
in order to fund that additional spending. It then follows that the marginal rate of substitution 
between items after accounting for changes in tax payments is: 
 
( )
( )5i
5j
i
j
ij ββ
ββ
α
α
MRS +
+−=−=  (5.5) 
 
In order to maintain the original level of utility, a one-unit increase in expenditure on item i 
requires a decrease in expenditure on item j of (βi+β5)/(βj+β5). Taxes change by the sum of 
these expenditure changes, i.e. (βj-βi)/(βj+β5). 
 
Because parameter estimates from the multinomial logit model are unique only up to a scale 
factor, fixing the marginal utility of money at unity (i.e. β5 = -1) does not allow estimation of 
β. Simple transformations of the utility function, such as the polynomial functional form or 
the addition of constant terms to the parameters do not resolve this problem.  
 
Policy 1:  Linear utility function 
Under Policy 1, when spending on one item (Xj) is reduced to allow increased spending on 
another (Xi) with a balanced budget (dXj = -dXi), the change in utility is [From (5.1)]: 
 
i
j
jii dX
dX
βdXβdV +=  
 
ji
i
ββ
dX
dV −=   
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In this case utility is maximized when spending is reallocated from the item(s) with the 
smallest β to the item(s) with the largest β. The same result is obtained when (5.3) is 
estimated. 
 
( ) ( )
i
j
5ji5i dX
dX
ββdXββdV +++=  
( ) ( ) ( )ji5j5i
i
ββββββ
dX
dV −=+−+=   
 
All spending should be transferred to the item with the largest marginal utility net of tax 
(βi+β5). Inability to estimate (5.1) is not problematic for Policy 1. 
 
Policy 2:  Linear utility function 
β5 is the marginal utility of taxes, which is expected to be negative. The marginal utility of 
raising taxes to spend on Xi is βi+β5. Raising taxes to increase spending on Xi will increase 
utility if βi > -β5. Consequently, whenever marginal utility net of tax (βi+β5) is positive taxes 
should be increased to allow additional spending on item i. Because the βs are independent of 
expenditure levels, the linear utility function approximation cannot be used to identify how 
much additional tax should be raised to provide for increased spending on any item. 
 
Policy 3:  Linear utility function 
Raising taxes to increase spending on Xi will increase utility if βi > -β5. Where βi < -β5 
spending should be decreased. Consequently, whenever marginal utility net of tax (βi+β5) is 
positive taxes should be increased to allow additional spending on item i. The linear utility 
function implies that spending should be increased indefinitely on all items with positive 
marginal utility net of tax (βi+β5>0) and spending should cease on items for which (βi+β5<0). 
Because marginal utility is constant, the linear utility function cannot be used to identify the 
optimal change in spending on any item. 
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5.3  Results 
 
Results for linear and second order polynomial models are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Linear and Second Order Polynomial Models 
 
Multinomial logit 
models (asymptotic  
t-scores in 
parentheses) 
 
Model A 
 
Model B 
 
Model C 
 
Model D 
 
Model E 
 
Model F 
Health 0.010883 (10.36) 
0.011038 
(10.31) 
0.0072626 
(1.96) 
0.011594 
(10.53) 
0.011625 
(10.59) 
0.01071 
(10.00) 
Education 0.0082587 (7.89) 
0.0083475 
(7.79) 
0.020786 
(5.38) 
0.022000 
(5.85) 
0.022221 
(5.92) 
0.008683 
(7.93) 
Income support -0.0069956 (-6.99) 
-0.0073847 
(-7.24) 
-0.024151 
(-6.79) 
-0.024724 
(-7.04) 
-0.024598 
(-7.02) 
-0.007255 
(-7.02) 
Environment & 
 conservation 
0.0068592 
(6.67) 
0.012895 
(3.21) 
0.016429 
(3.77) 
0.017485 
(4.08) 
0.021370 
(5.81) 
0.006865 
(6.63) 
Age*health   0.000083809 (1.21) 
   
Age*education 
 
  -0.00023861 
(-3.38) 
-0.00025854 
(-3.76) 
-0.00026354 
(-3.85) 
 
Age*support   0.00032656 (4.94) 
0.00033610 
(5.16) 
0.00033529 
(5.16) 
 
Age*environment  -0.00020045 (-3.10) 
-0.00025605 
(-3.69) 
-0.00027336 
(-4.03) 
-0.00027819 
(-4.12) 
 
Nz born* environment  0.0052368 (2.11) 
0.0048372 
(1.92) 
0.0048012 
(1.91) 
  
Health2      0.00003089 
(0.89) 
Education2   
 
  -
0.0000546
2 
(-1.62) 
Support2      -0.0000360
3 
(-1.04) 
Environment2      0.00001808 
(0.52) 
McFadden’s R2 0.096 0.110 0.135 0.134 0.130 0.099 
 
 
These models have moderate predictive ability. However, the core independent variables are 
highly significant2. Marginal utility from health spending appears to be relatively uniform 
across all ages, whereas the relative benefits from spending on superannuation and income 
support increase with age and benefits from spending on education and the environment 
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decline with age, and at similar rates. New Zealand born respondents perceive greater value 
from environmental spending than do others, although this effect is of marginal significance. 
 
Table 5 provides estimates of MRS and differences in marginal utilities, along with 95% 
confidence intervals that have been derived using 10,000 replications in a Monte Carlo 
procedure described by Krinsky and Robb (1986).  
 
Table 5 
Relative Benefits of Spending: Linear Models [95% confidence intervals] 
 
βi - βj MRSji  
i,j Model A Model E 
(50 years)# 
Model A Model E 
(50 years)# 
Health,  
Education 
0.0026* 
[0.0000092 ~ 0.0052] 
0.0025 
[-0.0081 ~ 0.0128] 
-1.32¶ 
[-1.77 ~ -1.01] 
-1.29 
[-10.2 ~ 6.5] 
Health,  
Income Support 
0.0179* 
[0.0149 ~ 0.0209] 
0.0194* 
[0.0108 ~ 0.0281] 
1.56¶ 
[1.15 ~ 2.20] 
1.48 
[-4.5 ~ 10.9] 
Health, 
Environment 
0.0040* 
[0.0014 ~ 0.0066] 
0.0041 
[-0.0098 ~ 0.0177] 
-1.59¶ 
[-2.25 ~ -1.16] 
-1.56 
[-15.8 ~ 12.6] 
Education,  
Income Support 
0.0153* 
[0.0123 ~ 0.0183] 
0.0170* 
[0.0054 ~ 0.0283] 
1.18¶ 
[0.84 ~1.69] 
1.15 
[-4.9 ~ 11.6] 
Education, 
Environment 
0.0014 
[-0.0012 ~ 0.0041] 
0.0016 
[-0.0075 ~ 0.0109] 
-1.20 
[-1.77 ~ -0.84] 
-1.21 
[-8.4 ~ 4.9] 
Environment, 
Income Support 
0.0139* 
[0.0108 ~ 0.0170] 
0.0153* 
[0.0043 ~ 0.0265] 
0.98¶ 
[0.66 ~ 1.45] 
0.95 
[-12.4 ~ 14.9] 
#  Marginal utility ratios are age-dependent. The marginal utility ratios reported in this table 
   are for a person of the age of the average respondent (50 years). 
* Significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
¶ Significantly different from negative one at the 95% confidence level 
 
 
The coefficient differences (βi - βj) allow the items to be ranked. A positive difference 
indicates that transferring spending from item j to item i increases utility. Three coefficient 
differences in Model E are not significantly different from zero, meaning that Model E is 
unable to rank Health, Education and Environment, although it does indicate that marginal 
spending on any of these items provides more utility than spending on Income Support. 
 
The MRS results are interpreted as (using Model A as an example): After considering the tax 
implications, people are willing to accept a decrease in Education spending of $1.32 to obtain 
$1 of additional spending on Health (which results in tax savings of $0.32). On the other 
hand, spending on Income Support is viewed negatively – people desire less spending in this 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 Except for HEALTH in Model C, which is significant at “only” the 95% confidence level. 
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area. Increased spending on Income Support requires an accompanying increase in spending 
on other areas. In order to maintain initial utility, each extra dollar spent on Income Support 
requires extra spending on Environment & Conservation ($1.02), Education ($0.85), or 
Health ($0.64) respectively3. 
 
If MRSij is less than negative one then spending on item i is favoured.  The item pairs 
(Health, Environment) and (Health, Education) are the only instances in Table 5 where the 
whole 95% confidence range is less than –1. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that 
health spending provides more benefits than do either environment or education spending. 
The following hierarchy applies with better than 95% confidence: 
 
 MUHEALTH > {MUEDUCATION, MUENVIRONMENT} > 0 > MUINCOME SUPPORT 
 
While the MRS between Education and the Environment is not significantly different to –1, 
and the differences in marginal utilities are not significantly different from zero, the models 
consistently rank MUEDUCATION > MUENVIRONMENT 
 
The predictions from Model E vary dramatically with respondent age (Table 6). However, 
95% confidence intervals are very broad with this model. It is not possible to say 
unambiguously for any age group that the marginal rate of substitution is less than negative 
one.  
 
Table 6 
Model E Expected Marginal Rates of Substitution 
 
Age 
 
Health, 
Environment 
Education, 
Environment 
Support, 
Environment 
Health, 
Education 
Health, 
Support 
Education, 
Support 
20 
 
0.74 
[0.44~1.88] 
1.07 
[2.4~0.61] 
-1.13 
[-0.53~-3.25] 
0.69 
[1.31~0.46] 
-0.65 
[-0.45~-1.07] 
-0.95 
[-0.46~-1.70] 
30 
 
0.89 
[0.46~4.01] 
1.10 
[3.6~0.49] 
-1.12 
[-0.32~-6.12] 
0.81 
[2.06~0.50] 
-0.80 
[-0.51~-1.63] 
-0.98 
[-0.34~-2.34] 
40 
 
1.13 
[8.7~-5.6] 
1.14 
[5.7~-2.5] 
-1.09 
[7.0~-10.8] 
1.00 
[3.95~0.51] 
-1.04 
[-0.58~-3.50] 
-1.04 
[-0.13~-4.34] 
50 
 
1.56 
[15.8~-12.6] 
1.21 
[8.4~-4.9] 
-1.05 
[12.4~-14.9] 
1.29 
[10.2~-6.5] 
-1.48 
[4.5~-10.9] 
-1.15 
[4.9~-11.6] 
60 
 
2.48 
[20.6~-17.0] 
1.37 
[8.1~-5.7] 
-0.96 
[10.3~-10.7] 
1.81 
[19.3~-15.9] 
-2.59 
[22.8~-26.6] 
-1.43 
[18.5~-21.0] 
70 
 
6.13 
[21.8~-22.4] 
1.99 
[8.2~-6.3] 
-0.59 
[6.6~-5.2] 
3.08 
[23.8~-21.4] 
-10.31 
[33.4~-34.7] 
-3.35 
[18.4~-16.8] 
 
                                                 
3 Health: $0.64 = 1/$1.56, Education: $0.85 = 1/$1.18 
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Model B provides the opportunity to identify differences between people born in New 
Zealand and others (Table 7). Within origin groups, relative willingness to spend on Health 
and Education rather than on the Environment increases with age. This result is consistent 
with earlier models. New Zealand born respondents place a higher relative value on the 
environment than do those who are born overseas, with overseas born 70 year olds obtaining 
negative net benefits from additional environmental spending. 
 
Table 7 
Model B Expected Marginal Rates of Substitution 
 
Age Origin 
Health, 
Environment
Education, 
Environment 
Health, 
Education 
NZ Born 0.91 0.69 1.32 30 Not NZ Born 1.60 1.21 1.32 
NZ Born 1.36 1.03 1.32 50 Not NZ Born 3.84 2.91 1.32 
NZ Born 2.69 2.04 1.32 70 Not NZ Born -9.71 -7.34 1.32 
 
 
 
6. Logarithmic Model 
 
In principle, a logarithmic model has the ability to identify the full vector of β’s.  
 
Let V = β1log(X1+k) + β2log(X2+k) + β3log(X3+k) + β4log(X4+k) + β5log(TAX+4k) 
 (6.1) 
and TAX = X1+X2+X3+X4 
 
Then 
 
V = β1log(X1+k) + β2log(X2+k) + β3log(X3+k) + β4log(X4+k) + β5log(X1+X2+X3+X4+4k) 
 
The levels of the (changes in) variables in the choice questions are [–50, 0, 50]. Since 
logarithms do not exist for numbers less than or equal to zero, the independent variables must 
be transformed. This has been done by adding k to each attribute change level so the attribute 
changes become [k-50, k, k+50]. Clearly, k must be greater than 50. 
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Then, ( )kX
β
X
V)MU(X
i
i
i
i +=∂
∂=  
 ( )k4TAX
β
TAX
VMU(Tax)MU(Money) 5+−=∂
∂−=−=  
 
( )
( )kXβ
k4TAXβMRS
i5
i
XMoney, i +
+−=  
At initial conditions: 
 
 Xi = TAX = 0,  
 
∴ 
5
i
XMoney, β
β4MRS
i
−=    
 
Policy 1 
Under Policy 1, when spending on one item (Xj) is reduced to allow increased spending on 
another (Xi) with a balanced budget (dXj = -dXi), the change in utility is: 
 
( ) ( ) jj jii i dXkX
β
dX
kX
β
dV +++=  
 
dXj = -dXi  
 
⇒  ( ) ( )kXβkXβdXdV j ji ii +−+=  
 
At initial conditions Xi = Xj = 0 
 
⇒  ( )
k
ββ
dX
dV ji
i
−=  
 
Transferring spending from j to i will increase welfare as long as βi > βj (Alternatively, βi/βj 
>1). 
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Since Xj = -Xi, optimal reallocation occurs when: 
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Policy 2 
Taxes are raised to fund increased spending on item i. 
 
iii dX
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X
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∂
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As before, dTAX = dXi    
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β
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β
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β
dX
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i
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This will be positive and spending should be increased on item i if -β5/βi < 4.   (6.2) 
 
This result is unsurprising given the earlier result: 
5
i
XMoney, β
β4MRS
i
−=  
 
For an optimum, dV/dXi = 0, i.e. 
 
  ( )
⎟⎟⎠
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5
i
i
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β
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When Xi is the only variable being changed ∑
≠
=
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j 0X  
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and: 
 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
+−=
i
5
*
i
β
β
1
31kX  
 
Policy 3 
When tax changes fund spending changes for multiple items, the following equation must be 
solved for all i (4 equations in 4 unknowns) to identify optimal spending on all items. 
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6.1 Results 
 
The logarithmic model requires selection of k. This was undertaken by searching over a range 
of values to maximise the fit of the model. Three different logarithmic models were 
estimated: 
 
Model G: U = β1log(X1+k) + β2log(X2+k) + β3log(X3+k) + β4log(X4+k) 
Model H: U = β1log(X1+k) + β2log(X2+k) + β3log(X3+k) + β4log(X4+k) + β5log(TAX+4k) 
Model I: U = β1log(X1+k) + β2log(X2+k) + β3log(X3+k) + β5log(TAX+4k) 
 
In each case, McFadden’s R2 continues to improve as k increases until the point where the 
models fail to converge (Table 8). The onset of convergence failure occurs at different points 
for the three models. Goodness of fit is almost identical for the three models at any given 
level of k. 
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Table 8 
Estimation of k 
 
McFadden’s R2  
k Model G Model H Model I 
200 .09401 .09425 .09416 
300 .09476 .09517 .09515 
330 .09488 .09531 .09528 
400 FTC .09556 .09546 
500 FTC FTC FTC 
FTC: Failed to converge 
 
 
The constant (k) has been set at 330 to allow comparison of the three models. Results for the 
logarithmic models are reported in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 
Logarithmic Models 
 
Multinomial logit models 
(asymptotic t-scores in parentheses) 
Model G Model H Model I 
Ln(HEALTH) 3.5706 (10.26) 6.7849 (1.72) 5.8684 (11.53) 
Ln(EDUCATION) 2.7300 (7.84) 5.9253 (1.50) 5.0127 (9.69) 
Ln(INCOME SUPPORT) -2.2476 (-6.94) 0.9054 (0.23)  
Ln(ENVIRONMENT) 2.2344 (6.60) 5.4349 (1.38) 4.5227 (8.93) 
Ln(TAX)  -12.9283 (-0.82) -9.2405 (-6.97) 
McFadden’s R2 .0949 .0953 .0953 
 
 
Model H is the preferred model because it identifies marginal utilities for all four expenditure 
items as well as for taxes. However, coefficients are uniformly non-significant in Model H. 
This problem appears to arise because 60% of the variance in TAX is explained by the other 
independent variables. Consequently, Model H is not retained for further analysis. Estimated 
coefficients in Models G and I are always very highly significant. Model G implies that 
additional taxes have no impact on utility, which is clearly at odds with expectations. Model I 
constrains marginal utility of Income Support expenditures to equal zero. In other words, it 
assumes that the public sees no benefits from additional spending on Income Support, just the 
implications of additional taxes. 
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Table 10 
Relative Benefits of Spending: Logarithmic Models 
 
 βi - βj MRSji 
i,j Model G Model I Model G Model I 
Health, 
Education 
0.85 
[-0.0001 ~ 1.69] 
0.86* 
[0.13 ~ 1.72] 
-1.31¶ 
[-1.77 ~ -1.00] 
-1.17¶ 
[-1.39 ~ -1.00] 
Health, 
Support 
5.82* 
[4.83 ~ 6.80] 
 1.59 
[1.17 ~ 2.25] 
 
Health, 
Environment 
1.34* 
[0.47 ~ 2.19] 
1.35* 
[0.60 ~ 2.20] 
-1.60¶ 
[-2.29 ~ -1.18] 
-1.30¶ 
[-1.57~ -1.10] 
Education, 
Support 
4.97* 
[3.97 ~ 5.96] 
 1.21¶ 
[0.84 ~ 1.69] 
 
Education, 
Environment 
0.49 
[-0.38 ~ 1.37] 
0.49 
[-0.26 ~ 1.38] 
-1.22 
[-1.75 ~ -0.86] 
-1.11 
[-1.34 ~ -0.92] 
Environment, 
Support 
4.48* 
[3.49 ~ 5.46] 
 0.99¶ 
[0.67 ~ 1.47] 
 
MRS = -MU(Xi)/MU(Xj)  
Numbers in square brackets [ ] are 95% confidence intervals 
* Significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level 
¶ Significantly different from negative one at the 95% confidence level 
 
 
The coefficient differences in Table 10 are not sensitive to the model specification and 
marginal rates of substitution are similar across the two models. These models yield the same 
hierarchy of marginal utilities as the linear models (Table 5). 
 
Policy 1:  Logarithmic utility function 
The coefficient differences in Table 10 indicate that utility would be increased if spending 
were transferred between individual items as indicated in Table 11. In each case the tax take 
is unaltered, as is expenditure on items other than the two identified. In both models 
differences in benefits from spending on Education or Environment are not statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 11 
Two Item Reallocations, Model I 
 
From To Optimal amount to 
reallocate 
Education Health $26 million 
Environment Health $43 million 
Environment Education $17 million 
Income Support Health unidentified 
Income Support Education unidentified 
Income Support Environment unidentified 
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Policy 2:  Logarithmic utility function 
Coefficient ratios identified in Table 12 are used to measure the utility of an increase in 
spending on particular items, funded by an increase in taxes.  
 
Table 12 
Coefficient Ratios, Model I 
 
Coefficient ratio Expected 
value 
95% confidence 
interval 
-βTAX/βHEALTH 1.57 1.25 ~ 1.88 
-βTAX/βEDUCATION 1.84 1.49 ~ 2.20 
-βTAX/βENVIRONMENT   2.04 1.66 ~ 2.44 
 
 
Because each of the ratios in Table 12 is less than 4, an independent increase in spending on 
each item would increase utility (Equation 6.2, page 19). 
 
Model I provides the opportunity to derive the utility maximising level of spending for each 
item, with spending on all other items remaining unchanged. 
 
Recall, 
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From the Model I coefficient ratios in Table 12 it can be deduced that optimal changes in 
levels of spending on each item, when spending on other sectors is held constant, are as 
shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 
Optimal Partial Changes in Item Spending 
 
 Expected 
($ million) 
95% confidence 
interval 
Health +$1,393 $796 ~ $3,630 
Education +$844 $495 ~ $1,690 
Environment +$619 $358 ~ $1,170 
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Care must be applied in using the results in Table 13. The optimal changes in single-item 
spending are well beyond the changes investigated in the choice experiment, where spending 
on individual items could vary only within a range of ±$50 million from the status quo. These 
results do, however, support small increases of taxes to fund additional spending on these 
three items and indicate that further investigation of larger changes is warranted. 
 
Policy 3:  Logarithmic utility function 
Equation 6.2 identifies the utility maximising level of any expenditure item, given the level 
of all other expenditure items. The global optimum (Policy 3) is found by simultaneously 
solving for all expenditure items in 6.3. 
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Simultaneous solution of 6.3 indicates that spending on Income Support should be decreased 
and taxes increased substantially (by over 100 billion dollars) to fund additional spending on 
Health, Education and Environment. These solutions are extreme extrapolations beyond the 
data with little relevance to policy, so they are not reported here.  
 
Model I can be used to investigate specific policy initiatives, however. Suppose that spending 
on Income Support were to be reduced – what should happen to the savings? There are two 
broad options, reduction in taxation, or dispersal amongst the other expenditure items. 
Maximisation of the utility function (Equation 6.1) with the additional constraint that total 
taxes equal zero indicates the optimal dispersal solutions in Table 14. 
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Table 14 
Optimal Tax-Neutral Reallocation with Reduction in Income Support Expenditure 
 
 Change in Expenditure ($ million) 
Income Support 0 
(status quo) 
-$100 -$150 -$200 -$300 
Health +$47 +$85 +$104 +$123 +$161 
Education -$8 +$25 +$41 +$57 +$90 
Environment -$39 -$10 +$5 +$19 +$49 
Tax 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
The optimal reallocations in Table 14 reflect the marginal utility rankings. Under unaltered 
allocation to Income Support it is desirable to shift expenditure from relatively low marginal 
utility items to Health, resulting in less spending on Education and Environment. Once 
Income Support expenditure is decreased a significant amount it is no longer optimal to 
reduce spending on Education and Environment. However, the relatively high marginal 
utility of Health means that it will always receive the bulk of any expenditure reallocation. 
 
 
7. Discussion 
 
Mathematical modelling has been used to show how, on aggregate, respondents are willing to 
trade off budget allocations between sectors. This modelling exercise indicates that people 
obtain negative utility from allocating money to income support, consistent with the stated 
desire to cut spending on superannuation and income support in Question 9. Older 
respondents are not as averse to spending on income support, but are still generally in favour 
of cuts in spending on this item. Spending on the other three items (health, education, 
environment) yields positive benefits. Respondents see significantly more benefits (at the 
95% confidence level) from spending on health, than on education or the environment. 
Spending on education is expected to provide more benefits than spending on the 
environment, although this difference is not significant at the 95% confidence level. There is 
a marginally significant effect that indicates that people born in New Zealand are more in 
favour of spending on the environment than is the case for people not born in New Zealand. 
Willingness to spend on health is not affected by respondent age, but willingness to spend on 
education and the environment both decline with age. 
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Kemp and Willetts (1995b) found “Items which appear to be regarded as particularly good 
value relative to their costs … include the police, the Department of Conservation, public 
hospitals and schools. Those regarded as particularly poor value compared to their costs are 
the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra, Unemployment Benefits, Domestic Purpose Benefits, 
and defence.” [p.29]. The highest marginal value ratings are achieved by health, education 
and police (Kemp & Willetts, 1995a; Kemp, 1998; Kemp & Burt, 2001). The present study 
addresses a much narrower range of government services than these earlier studies, but 
indicates similar perceptions about the value of government services. The macro-budget 
allocation exercise indicates a preference for large reductions in spending on superannuation 
and income support. The major beneficiaries of budget reallocation would be health and 
conservation, with education and crime prevention gaining smaller amounts and the smallest 
amount would go to defence. Similarly, the choice experiment indicates preferences for 
reduced spending on income support, with the community signalling a strong desire to spend 
more on health, and being willing to support additional spending on education and the 
environment, but education and environment spending provide lower marginal benefits than 
health spending. These studies all indicate a strong community preference for spending on 
health, education and the environment rather than on social security. 
 
Because of high correlations the logarithmic model did not resolve the identification problem 
inherent in the linear and polynomial models. Logarithmic utility function results mirror 
those of the linear model, indicating efficiency benefits from transferring budget from income 
support to health, education and environment, with the bulk of reallocated funds going to 
health spending. The logarithmic utility function model has the ability to account for costs of 
service provision and illustrates that the community is willing to increase taxes to increase 
spending on health, education, and the environment. 
 
The environmental budget allocation exercise provides little guidance on which aspects of 
environmental spending would provide the greatest benefits at the margin. For most items the 
modal response was no change in current spending. However, more than 50% of respondents 
indicated they preferred increased spending on pest & weed control, air quality and fresh 
waters. 
 
The choice experiment approach to identification of efficient budget allocation is novel. This 
application has been successful in that marginal rates of substitution between individual 
budget categories have been estimated within relatively narrow confidence intervals. The 
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model has been less successful at measuring the marginal utility of spending on particular 
items. In theory, this can be done using the logarithmic utility function, but high correlations 
meant this did not occur in practice. This problem may be surmountable by including 
additional spending items in the choice sets or increasing the number of attributes in the 
experimental design. In particular, the income support item is probably too poorly defined, it 
incorporates a large number of specific budget items. Disaggregation of income support may 
remove the high correlation between taxes and income support that precluded inclusion of 
both variables in the models. An alternative solution may rest in utilisation of alternative 
functional forms. 
 
A criterion validity test of community preferences is not possible because there is no 
objective measure against which stated preferences can be assessed. Consequently, less 
powerful indicators of model validity are required. In this case there are several indicators of 
convergent validity. The results obtained in the macro-budget allocation question and the 
choice experiment are in agreement. Further, the results obtained here concur with the 
extensive evidence presented by Kemp and associates. This weight of evidence suggests that 
the community would prefer less government spending on income support and increased 
spending on health and education. It also indicates that increased environmental spending is 
likely to be advantageous. 
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